

George Horton's Truth on Genocide and Smyrna and Why it Matters.

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George Horton's experience as an American diplomat reveals important truths about the interwar period in the Near East. During three decades of service before, during, and after World War I, he witnessed the genocide and ethnic cleansing of Christians, including the sacking and burning of Smyrna when Turkish Nationalists took the city in 1922 and renamed it "Izmir." He protested American complicity in the whitewashing and coverup of atrocities and published a book on what happened. Modern scholarship confirms that Horton reported events accurately and that his historical account remains important for multiple reasons, to include better understanding of the genocides that took place during World War II.

The Growing Gap between Western and Turkish Scholarship

Before explaining Horton's significance, the issue of his reliability must be addressed. Even as the Asia Minor genocides and burning of Smyrna were taking place, Turkish officials organized a massive effort to hide the truth.¹ They were aided by American officials who wanted a treaty with Turkey that they hoped would facilitate access to oil. Admiral Mark Bristol, the senior U.S. representative in Constantinople, issued a stream of false and misleading reports about the genocides, and Allen Dulles, the head of the Department of State's Near East division, drafted false and misleading responses to Congress.² The French government also was duplicitous,³ joining the Turks in blaming Armenians for the conflagration in Smyrna.⁴ Horton and others⁵ vehemently contested these falsehoods and were maligned for doing so.

Scholars confronted with such conflicting sources must determine which ones are more credible. Western (i.e., American and European) scholars generally consider Horton reliable. Lou Ureneck's take on Horton in his book, *The Great Fire*, is typical of Western

scholars. He credits Horton for winning “favor with Turks and Greeks” in Smyrna,⁶ and emphasizes how well-informed he was:

If any American, or European for that matter, knew what was happening in and around Smyrna, it was Horton. In Smyrna as well as the hinterlands to the south and east, Horton's friends and network of discreet sources kept him informed. Horton's web included the Onassis brothers, successful tobacco traders in the city, but there were many others—Greek, Armenian, Levantine, and Turkish eyes and ears—upon which he relied for intelligence.... and he relished his contact with people high and low. He spoke impeccable Greek and French and passable Italian and Turkish, and he had made it his business to parley with local officials, clergy, shopkeepers, foreign consuls, shepherds, fig traders, farmers, waterfront men, and soldiers.⁷

Other Western scholars also laud Horton⁸ and rely heavily on his reporting.⁹ However, Turkish scholars or those sympathizing with the Turkish government generally consider Horton unreliable and biased,¹⁰ and some even dismiss recent scholarship by arguing it is just an extension of Horton’s anti-Turkish bias.¹¹ These opposing Western and Turkish perspectives on Horton, Smyrna, and the Asia Minor genocides have not diminished over time but rather grown.

Charges of Bias and Intolerance against Horton

Admiral Bristol was one of the first to attack Horton’s credibility. Horton’s status in the Department of State as a respected expert on the Near East made it difficult for Bristol to criticize him directly, so Bristol did it indirectly, insinuating Horton was biased because of his Greek wife.¹² Bristol’s biographer, Peter Buzanski, followed Bristol’s lead, claiming that during Smyrna’s sacking, “Horton suffered a breakdown, resigned from the diplomatic service, and spent the balance of his life writing anti-Turkish, pro-Greek books”¹³—all demonstrably false assertions.¹⁴

Later, Justin McCarthy, like Buzanski, extended Horton’s alleged pro-Greek bias to include the charge that he was anti-Turk.¹⁵ In 2001, Corinna Tsakiridou adopted that premise and argued it was a by-product of his Western heritage,¹⁶ a thesis she tried to substantiate by selectively citing passages from Horton’s 1926 book, *The Blight of Asia*. More recently, Hakan Gungor hypothesized that “Horton’s explicit hostility toward the Muslims and Turks” resulted from his “growing up in a conservative Protestant family and being a Philhellene.” He also argued Horton’s admiration of American missionaries led him to “deceive” the world about Asia Minor and Smyrna.¹⁷

Brian Coleman was more even-handed. He described Horton as a philhellene who admired the elements of ancient Greek culture that contributed so much to Western Civilization. He thought Horton's love of Western classics fueled his "moral courage" and desire "to tell the truth," and that his testimony on Smyrna "still rings true" "eighty years later."¹⁸ At the same time, Coleman argued that a Western orientation "nurtured Horton's prejudice" and concluded Horton was guilty of "a demonization of Muslims in general and of Turks in particular." He advised readers to "learn from both what is true and what is false" in Horton's writings,¹⁹ but nowhere in his article did Coleman identify a single false statement Horton made.

Some critics mischaracterize Horton out of ignorance, which is somewhat excusable given the dearth of biographical information about him in the public domain until recently. Even admirers of Horton get basic facts about him wrong,²⁰ and a few have also wrongly depicted him as a Christian zealot. Some mischaracterizations of Horton, however, are based on false information or manufactured by quoting him out of context. In the following section we examine the criticisms of Horton and demonstrate they are false. Horton was neither a bigot nor a religious zealot; in fact, he was quite the opposite.

Exonerating Horton of Bigotry

Roger Jennings has promulgated the most egregious falsehoods about Horton.²¹ His allegations, made repeatedly and without evidence, are so demonstrably untrue and at odds with all other primary sources that they must be considered willful disinformation. For example, he promulgates the notion that Horton refused to mediate with the Turks to save refugee lives. He does so despite the availability of multiple histories of Smyrna's demise, dating from the 1970s, that quote Horton's cable to the Department of State requesting permission to mediate with the Turks to prevent violence and save lives.²² These same primary sources prove Horton was explicitly prohibited from mediation by President Warren Harding, acting upon the recommendation of the acting Secretary of State. We have corrected all Jennings' misrepresentations in an earlier article, so they do not require further comment here.²³

Another gross mischaracterization of Horton comes from Justin McCarthy. He cites a 1919 telegram sent from Smyrna to the Secretary of State accusing Horton of bias. Two Americans residing in Smyrna concocted the telegram, one of whom Horton had previously demoted and then fired for being a "habitual drunkard of bad conduct, partisan views and violent language."²⁴ Unaware of this history, senior officials launched a high-level review of Horton for bias. Albert Putney, chief of the Near East division, conducted the investigation. Putney was a lawyer with a scholarly bent who became well-known for

his prestigious twelve-volume, "Putney's Law Library." His report concluded the allegations were "much mistaken":

I annex some of the telegrams recently received from Mr. Horton which show that he has not hesitated to criticize the conduct of the Greeks at Smyrna, in cases where he thought they were deserving criticism. ...I think that a study of his telegrams and dispatches (which would appear to be the best evidence in the case) show that he furnishes the Department with all the information which he can secure and presents both sides of every case. In this respect he stands out in a striking but pleasing contrast with many of our officials abroad who always limit themselves to the presentation of one side of the case.²⁵

Putney sent this analysis to Wilbur Carr, the chief of the U.S. Consular Service, who agreed that Horton's cables demonstrated "conclusively that Horton has been reporting fairly." Carr forwarded the entire package to the Secretary of State who reached the same conclusion. Thus, the attack on Horton backfired, proving the opposite of what the schemers, and later McCarthy, claimed. Other mischaracterizations of Horton by Turkish authors have also proven false.²⁶

The unsubstantiated attack on Horton just reinforced the Department of State's view that Horton's reporting on the Greeks was remarkably clear-eyed. Like any good diplomat, Horton looked for common areas of interest with Greeks, but he did the same with the Ottomans and he did not hesitate to criticize either when he thought they were wrong.²⁷ The Department of State's positive view of Horton endured, as later became evident in correspondence with Bristol. Bristol, under fire from multiple groups for inaccurate, pro-Turk reporting, wrote to the Department that he was a neutral observer. He dismissed his critics by arguing it was "an incontrovertible fact that attitude of neutrality is misunderstood and construed by each faction as hostile to their particular cause." Warren Robbins, who replaced Putney as the Near East bureau chief, did not accept Bristol's excuse. He responded, "Other reports such as those from Consul Horton at Smyrna, etc., would lead one to believe that he is pro-Turkish if not anti-Greek."²⁸ In other words, he encouraged Bristol to do a better job emulating Horton's habit of telling both sides of the story.

Rather than manufacture false characterizations of Horton, some critics misrepresent Horton by quoting his book, *The Blight of Asia*, out of context. Context is important because Horton's book is part history and part policy argument. In his history, Horton is meticulous about distinguishing between what he personally knew was factual, and what he considered reliable based on the credibility of his sources. In his policy arguments, he was vehement but never failed to offer evidence and reasoning for his views. His stridency reflected the fact that he was combating government-sponsored

disinformation while urgently trying to save lives. As he wrote, major Western powers like the French, Italians, and some of his own superiors were whitewashing Turkish atrocities.²⁹ They were intent on rewarding genocide with the Lausanne treaties of friendship and commerce. To that end they argued Kemal and his Turkish Nationalists were different than the Ottoman leaders they replaced and would not replicate past Ottoman crimes.³⁰ Horton knew first-hand that the opposite was true; that Kemal had continued the ethnic cleansing and genocide begun by his predecessors and continued it even as the treaties were being negotiated.³¹

To counter Horton's testimony, Bristol and other Harding Administration officials maligned him as biased against Turks and Muslims. He defended himself from such charges so his readers would understand he was reporting truthfully and not from lesser motives. He noted there "have been great Mohammedan civilizations that have contributed much to the world's progress" that arose "through the fundamentally noble character and intelligence of the peoples that have founded them." Bagdad, he observed, was once "renowned as the greatest city in the world, a center of refinement, learning and art," until the Turks sacked the city and "massacred most of its inhabitants, contrary to the terms of capitulation." He contrasted "the mild Mohammedans of India," the "chivalrous Saladins of Syria," and the "cultured Moors of Spain," with the Turks and their massacres, writing, "It would not be fair to Mohammedans in general to say they approve of butchery and rape... as carried out by [the Turks]."³² None of Horton's critics acknowledge or explain such passages in his book.

Horton's only real objection to Islam was that, in practice, it seemed to condone violence against non-adherents. He acknowledged this was a disputed issue, writing "A great literature of commentary has grown up around the Koran, and it would be possible for its defenders to find much in it preaching tolerance." However, given the historical record, he believed Islam's "general effect upon its disciples, combined with the example of the Prophet's life, convincingly prove that Mohammedanism is a creed to be spread by the sword."³³ Horton said he did not make this observation "in a spirit of defamation of the Prophet, but as a statement of well-known historic facts." Clearly what Horton objected to was mass murder, not Islam *per se*.

The same is true of Horton's attitude toward the Turks. "I am aware of the many noble qualities of the Turkish peasant," he wrote, "but I do not agree with many precepts of his religion, and I do not admire him when he is cutting throats or violating Christian women."³⁴ He had seen enough over his decades of service to convince him the Turks of his day could be roused to "an outburst of fanaticism" "at a moment's notice;" that such violence "would need but a tiny spark to set off the powder mine—some adverse criticism of the Turk, the conversion of a Mohammedan." Again, Horton made it abundantly clear

that what he objected to was Turks engaging in mass murder and rape, not to their being Turks.

Instead of acknowledging Horton's real concerns, many of his critics quote him out of context to portray him as motivated by ethnic hatred. For example, Justin McCarthy, cited passages describing Turks as "the lowest of the Mohammedans intellectually" and "the only branch of the Mohammedan faith which has never made any contribution to the progress of civilization." McCarthy thinks these selective quotes are *prima facie* evidence of bigotry, but he ignored Horton's real argument which was about the origins of mass violence against innocents. Horton was trying to explain how the Turks in particular "could have developed such traits of ferocity and have left such a record of massacres." He provided a sophisticated, multivariate explanation.

First, he addressed the lack of constraints against mass murder. Horton admitted he had not "gone deeply into the subject," but he was inclined to believe experts such as John Lewis Burckhardt and Sir Edwin Pears who thought the Turks had made no contributions to civilization that would incline them to restrain their violence. He noted other Muslims were impressed by the Turks' martial prowess but did not consider them "their intellectual or moral equal."³⁵ Many Europeans agreed, observing the Ottoman Turks dominated their empire's administrative and security organs but made little to no contributions to the arts or humanities.³⁶ Horton also examined incentives for mass violence. He thought the proximate cause was that Turkish leaders wanted to rid themselves of Christian competitors they could not keep pace with, but he also cited a range of other factors from lust and the desire for plunder to arrogant national chauvinism. Modern scholars agree with Horton that there were many factors involved. Morris and Ze'evi, for example, argue Turkish massacres were motivated by religion, politics, nationalism, greed (national and personal), revenge for territorial losses during wars, punishment for Christian support for civil liberties, and "sexual gratification."³⁷

Finally, some depict Horton as a Christian zealot. Actually, Horton split from his fundamentalist Methodist father early in life. His father torpedoed his budding political career by attacking Horton's mentor for holding Darwinian sympathies, and a little later annulled Horton's first marriage to a second cousin on religious grounds. Horton had such a troubled relationship with his father and his version of Christianity that he refused to be baptized or join a church until his late 50s. Horton was a sincere Christian who took Christ's teachings seriously, but he was not a fundamentalist nor was he reticent about criticizing church leaders or people he considered simple-minded about religion. He admired the self-sacrificing ethos of many missionaries, but he sharply disagreed with missionary leaders in Turkey. He condemned their policy of not speaking out on atrocities for fear the Turks would expel them. He also disparaged those leaders who gave priority to saving

their buildings rather than people. Horton refused to supplant evidence and reason with faith when it came to assessing world events. He lampooned religious fanatics of all persuasions with whom, he said, it was "impossible to argue." Their answer to everything is that "God will make a way." "God can, of course He can," Horton retorted, "but He doesn't, and probably He will not."

Horton was straightforward about his belief that Christianity was more progressive and defensible than Islam. His evidence for the superiority of Christianity was a comparison of the two faiths' origins and their subsequent histories, Islam's treatment of women, and the fact that for 500 years Islam did so little with "the fairest and richest part of the earth's surface" (i.e., Anatolia).³⁸ He also believed an open society with representative government was more progressive than the closed, authoritarian, Islamic governments of his day. These beliefs were part of his worldview, and they do not make him a bigot. It is possible to appreciate differences between cultures and faiths without being intolerant.

Yet Horton's candid discussion of religion is off-putting for some, including a few scholars who otherwise consider Horton a reliable historical witness. For example, Marjorie Dobkin quoted Horton approvingly but believed modern readers would be disturbed by Horton's book because of its "excessively religious overtones," which she asserted, "portray the Turks not only as destructive, but as the forces of anti-Christ."³⁹ Dobkin may be correct about the discussion of religion making some current readers uncomfortable, but the topic is unavoidable, and Horton's take on it was not "excessive."

Horton could not separate his historical account from religious issues because they were intertwined. The Turks, motivated in part by their religion, targeted Christians because of their religion. Modern scholarship supports Horton on this point, noting: "Turkish Muslim clerics and seminarians were prominent among the killers and jihadist rhetoric was prevalent, if not dominant, in sermons, billboards, and the Turkish press." Even though there was "not one case of Greeks or Armenians forcing Muslims to convert to Christianity anywhere in the Ottoman empire during 1894 to 1924," the Turks insisted they were fighting a religious war. "Proofs that the Ottoman and Turkish leaders from Abdul Hamid to Mustafa Kamal, saw the problem as one of the Christians rather than of the Armenians or Greeks or Syrians are abundant, not only in their actions but also in their words."⁴⁰ If Horton had ignored religion, he would have missed a central motivation for the genocides and the essential attribute of its victims.

Dobkin's comment about the "anti-Christ" is another case where context is critical. The comment is from Cardinal John Newman, not Horton. Horton quoted Newman and former British Prime Minister William Gladstone to emphasize the long, bloody history of Turkish rule over Christian minorities in areas under their control. The point he wanted to

drive home was that Christian and political leaders in an earlier era vigorously protested Turkish mass murder of 14,700 Bulgarian civilians in 1876, but church leaders and statesmen of his era were not condemning the Turks for murdering millions of their fellow citizens for being Christians. For Horton, Turkish leaders were “avowedly anti-Christian” in the sense that they were determined to expunge Christians and Christianity from Turkey,⁴¹ something history proved Horton was right about. Dobkin’s error, which others have made too, is in mistaking Horton’s discussion of religion for zealotry on his part when Horton was really focused on the horror of mass murder and the fact that world leaders at the time were not interested in stopping it.

Because so many authors have mischaracterized Horton as bigoted, *The Blight of Asia* is widely misconstrued as a diatribe against Turks. However, anyone actually reading the book will see that Horton was crystal clear about his purpose, which was to chastise and galvanize Christians to better behavior, not Turks.⁴² He emphasized this point multiple times, including in the book’s conclusion, where he asserted: “The chief lesson of these pages is the growing feebleness of Christianity—divided, insincere, permeated with materialism; undermined and befuddled,” and he called upon American missionaries in Turkey to come home and save America rather than trying to convert Turks.⁴³ He believed:

*the utter failure of Christianity to direct the policy of governments, as shown in this sad narrative, renders any campaign in Moslem countries a well-nigh hopeless task. I am convinced, also, that an examination of our private lives and conduct, will convince anyone that the conversion of Americans is a more crying need than that of Mohammedans. What America needs, and what Europe needs, is a great spiritual awakening.*⁴⁴

Horton was trying to change American hearts, not Turkish policy, which was fixed and succeeding and would not change unless the great powers of his era demanded it. For that to happen, Horton believed “the awful truth must be known in all its hideous details.” Only then might there be some chance “to arouse the Christian world to a sense of the apathy into which it has fallen and the degrading depths to which commercialism has brought the so-called Christian nations of the earth.”⁴⁵ In his chapter on “Mohammedanism and Christianity” Horton again had harsher things to say about Christians than Muslims. He explained to Americans why “Islamism is ousting Christianity in those places where it meets it face to face.” Among other things, he asserted denominational infighting among Christians and the fact that Christian nations fought each other in WWI had undermined Christ’s reputation among Muslims as the Prince of Peace.⁴⁶

In sum, reading *The Blight of Asia* in its entirety, rather than cherry-picked excerpts, makes it clear that Horton was anti-genocide, not anti-Turk or anti-Muslim. His lack of

bigotry is even more evident in his behavior. Horton insisted his “constant policy during the long time that I was in the Near East, was to befriend, in so far as my official position permitted, all who might be in need of help, irrespective of race or religion,” and his behavior proves it. He repeatedly helped Muslim, Jewish, and Christian refugees, petitioners, and prisoners by directly intervening on their behalf and indirectly assisting them through aid programs he initiated. A long list of such cases has been documented,⁴⁷ including relief for Muslim refugees from the Balkans in 1912, for Jewish refugees in Salonica after the city burned in 1917, for Turks during the Greek occupation of Smyrna, and for many Christians before and after Smyrna’s demise.

For example, Horton intervened on behalf of Turks in Smyrna so frequently that his “office was daily a refuge for Mohammedan delegations.” This was so much the case that in Athens, Greece he gained a reputation for being “pro-Turk.”⁴⁸ His sympathetic treatment of Turks was documented in a letter from eighteen Turkish civic leaders in Smyrna, including Ilimdar Zade Edhem, President of the Islamic Emigration Committee, and Halil Zeki, owner of the popular Turkish paper, the “Shark Gazette.” They asserted Horton had “won the heart of the whole Turkish nation by the sympathy and good will” he demonstrated during the Greek occupation. Horton, they wrote, gave “full protection and kindly treatment to those of the Turks who went to him for protection and the right of humane existence.”⁴⁹ Horton said he had “most friendly and even affectionate recollections” of the signatories and many other Turks and insisted he “would gladly welcome an occasion” “to be of service to them again.”⁵⁰ His humanitarian efforts prove this is true, and that his beliefs motivated his compassion, not bigotry.

Exonerating Horton of False Witness

In addition to denying the Asia Minor genocides and accusing Horton of bigotry, Turkish scholars typically deny Turkish forces burned Smyrna and accuse Horton, who insisted otherwise, of bearing false witness. Many general histories just note the cause of the fire is disputed, but multiple book-length studies, benefiting from recent archival sources, reach the same conclusion Horton did a hundred years ago,⁵¹ and largely for the same three major reasons Horton promulgated. First, he noted Turkish officers were in total control of both their regular and irregular forces, all of whom instantly obeyed commands, as diverse eyewitnesses testified. Horton, who had much experience investigating Turkish massacres, was sure they began and ended when Turkish authorities dictated, and that was the case in Smyrna.

Second, he argued Turkish forces were in complete control of Smyrna. Other than an initial incident by one bomb-thrower on the docks, which was quickly suppressed by a

volley of gunfire from Turkish calvary, there was no organized resistance to the Turkish occupation of the city. Greek authorities had debated arming the population for self-defense and decided against it.⁵² As Horton observed, "The Greek soldiers had all been gone five days, and the problem of maintaining order among the frightened and helpless inhabitants [of Smyrna] was the same as would confront a pack of wolves in a sheepfold." It was widely agreed, even by pro-Turk observers, that Turkish authorities could have imposed order any time they chose.⁵³

Third, Turkish forces were also in complete control of the fire. While some American, French, and Italian officials covered up Turkish atrocities, American, French, and Italian citizens in Smyrna testified they saw Turkish soldiers setting and directing the fires, as did British, Armenian and other eyewitnesses.⁵⁴ A partial list of those who were neither Armenian nor Greek but reported seeing Turkish soldiers set and direct the fire would include vice consul Maynard Barnes, Theodore Bartoli (Italian), Anna Birge, Catholic priests of the Mechitharist Order (French), Claflin Davis, Frank Dracopoli (Italian), Edward Fisher, Anne Gordon (Canadian), Harold Jacquith, Mr. Joubert (French), Arthur Maxwell (British), Minnie Mills, Mark O. Prentiss, Rev. C.T. Riggs (quoting Dana Getchell), and Dr. Wilfred Post.

In addition, a great deal of indirect evidence indicates who set and guided the fires. Only the Christian sections of Smyrna were burned, not the Turkish and Jewish quarters in the south of the city. As French author Herve Georgelin argues, this pattern could only benefit Turkish authorities and not the persecuted Christians.⁵⁵ After the fire died down, Turkish authorities dynamited what remained of the few surviving churches in the northern sections of the city, making clear their intent to expunge the Christian presence.⁵⁶ As Horton argued, the very slogan, "Turkey for the Turks," revealed the policy of Turkish leaders from Abdul Hamid to Kemal.⁵⁷

Still, Turkish scholars continue to deny Turkish responsibility for Smyrna's destruction and accuse those who document the opposite of being biased. Heath Lowry made this point in an article chastising Marjorie Dobkin for cherry-picking evidence.⁵⁸ Lowry tried to prove Dobkin was biased by himself cherry-picking evidence for the opposite viewpoint. He emphasized Mark Prentiss' interview of Paul Grescovich, the man in charge of the Smyrna fire department. Grescovich said Armenians lit fires and Turkish soldiers tried to extinguish them. Western scholars cite fireman Emmanuel Katsaros' testimony that Turkish soldiers lit the fires. When he challenged the soldiers, he was told, "You have your orders and we have ours. This is Armenian property. Our orders are to set fire to it."⁵⁹ Lowry faults Dobkin for writing a polemic rather than "sound historical scholarship."⁶⁰ What he really demonstrated is that researchers must assess the credibility

of witnesses when their accounts conflict. Dobkin believed Katsaros was a more credible witness than Grescovich, and not without good reasons.

Turkish authorities had a record of blatant lying about their atrocities. They used propaganda to confuse public opinion, and the highest authorities directed and participated in the deception.⁶¹ For example, in July 1921, when missionaries and naval officers reported the Turks were killing and deporting the Pontic Greeks, Bristol was directed to make a personal appeal to Kemal to stop the horrors. Kemal had his Minister of Foreign Affairs respond to Bristol with a bald-faced lie, telling Bristol the reports were "completely in error. Absolutely no measure of this kind has been taken."⁶² The following year, when Kemal met with French officials just two days after the fires in Smyrna started, he immediately blamed them on Armenians and Greeks.⁶³ Some Kemal fabrications were so outlandish they inverted history. At a September 1919 nationalist gathering in Sivas, he "accused the Greek army and Ottoman Greeks of a 'general massacre of the Moslem population' and charged the Armenian Republic at Yerevan with carrying out a 'policy of extermination' against that region's Muslims," the exact opposite of the truth.⁶⁴ What should have been obvious, Horton argued, was that the Christians minorities never had the means to carry out such crimes.⁶⁵ But it was standard practice for Turkish propagandists to accuse Turkish victims of what the Turks were themselves doing, and over time that solidified into official Turkish government history and policy.

Turkish authorities also diminished their credibility by threatening those challenging their narrative. For example, the Turks demanded and obtained the dismissal of Edgar J. Fisher, professor at Robert College, for comments he allegedly made during a lecture on a tourist ship, by threatening to close the college. Ralph Harlow, a professor at the international college in Smyrna, was banned from Turkey for his comments in American publications about Turkish persecution of Christians. This too became standard Turkish policy. When, years later, Horton used testimony from employees of the MacAndrews & Forbes Company in *The Blight of Asia*, the company's president wrote to Horton complaining about it. "You are well aware of the friendly feeling we all have for you," he wrote, adding "We have no criticism to make of [the book's] merit as an accurate compilation of historical facts." But he reminded Horton, his company had "to continue to do business with Turkey" and he thought Horton should have been more circumspect given his "knowledge of the Turkish mentality."⁶⁶ Attempts to silence critics of the Turkish government's version of events continue to the present day.⁶⁷

Further, those Western sources who supported Turkish propaganda in Horton's era have been exposed by declassified national documents. For example, Admiral Bristol's habit of filing false reports and supporting Turkish propaganda has been thoroughly documented with declassified materials from the U.S. national archives. Bristol engineered

a misleading report on the Greek occupation of Smyrna,⁶⁸ filed false reports on Turkish massacres,⁶⁹ promoted fake news through newsmen,⁷⁰ and repeatedly inverted history in support of Turkish propaganda.⁷¹ False statements from French officials also have been exposed by research in the French archives.⁷²

Another reason Turkish sources must be considered with skepticism is that Turkey's archives have been widely culled and bowdlerized. According to Taner Akcam, they are nevertheless sufficient to conclusively prove Turkish leaders committed genocide.⁷³ However, other scholars, such as Morris and Ze'evi, who investigated the Turkish archives, note that "relying only, or principally, on Turkish state archives and published Turkish official volumes will inevitably produce highly distorted history."⁷⁴ In contrast, Western archives show no such signs of tampering and are replete with embarrassing primary documents that prove, for example, some of their government officials were lying.⁷⁵

Many secondary sources supporting the Turkish government positions are also suspect. Western scholars often ignore Greek and Turkish sources to avoid bias or the appearance of it.⁷⁶ They also consider the reliability of sources and identify errors made in earlier publications.⁷⁷ In contrast, Turkish secondary sources often attack authors disputing their thesis regardless of how well substantiated their claims are⁷⁸ and uncritically accept previous sources supporting their theses regardless of their errors.⁷⁹ Pro-Turkish authors also undermine their own credibility by selectively quoting sources, misconstruing evidence, and making claims unsupported by the preponderance of evidence or any evidence at all. We have already reviewed McCarthy's misapplication of evidence. Heath Lowry and Maxime Gauin, two of the most prominent supporters of official Turkish government positions, make similar errors.⁸⁰

For example, Lowry wrongly uses an irrelevant observation from Captain Hepburn to discredit testimony that Turkish soldiers burned Smyrna. Hepburn noted he and Maynard Barnes watched Turkish soldiers supervising the destruction of the passport office on the quay but were too far away to determine individual identities. From that observation Lowry suggests Barnes, one of Horton's vice consuls, must be wrong about a completely different incident during which he observed Turkish soldiers spreading kerosene outside the U.S. Consulate. Both incidents, Turkish soldiers calmly standing by while the passport office was torched,⁸¹ and Turkish soldiers spreading flammable liquids in front of the U.S. consulate, substantiate Turkish culpability, the opposite of what Lowry alleges. The issue of whether individual identities could be determined in the case of the passport office being set ablaze is irrelevant.

Lowry also uses a comment Grescovich made about Turkish soldiers blowing up buildings to impede the fire to support his claim that all sightings of Turkish soldiers must "be assumed to be part of the fire-fightings rather than incendiary attempts."⁸² This

conclusion makes no sense. Whether Turkish soldiers were bombing buildings to impede the fire or further demolish Christian property in no way invalidates the many sightings of Turkish soldiers spreading flammable liquids on streets and buildings and setting them aflame. In fact, those testimonies make it more likely soldiers were thoroughly destroying rather than attempting to save the Christian quarter. Lowry's bogus arguments undermine his own credibility as well as the veracity of Grescovich.⁸³ Other Lowry articles also make false arguments that undermine his reputation for scholarly work.⁸⁴

Maxime Gauin's article, "Revisiting the Fire of Izmir," is the most recent article on Smyrna by a Turkish scholar and the most unbelievable.⁸⁵ He began with a false history of the Greek occupation of Smyrna in May 1919⁸⁶ and added other misrepresentations. For example, he asserts the French consul, Michel Graillet, declared the Smyrna arsonists were Armenians and Greeks. He accuses Herve Georgelin, a French scholar who argues Turkish soldiers fired the city, of ignoring Graillet's correspondence. On the contrary, Georgelin offers a range of evidence for his conclusion and specifically addresses Graillet's reports:

All the reports signed by Graillet affirm on the contrary that the responsibility for the fire lies with the Turks: "the fire [...] lit, according to the statements of [French Mechitharist monks], by Turkish soldiers who would have sprayed the Armenian quarter with oil and fuels." Some later French diplomatic couriers claim that Graillet is finally convinced by the official Turkish thesis. But no document signed by him confirms these assertions.⁸⁷

Gauin also selectively cites sources who are not credible, notably Mark Prentiss and Maynard Barnes. Both men were new arrivals in Smyrna with no knowledge of local languages and both were under Bristol's influence.⁸⁸ Both men initially told the truth and then backtracked to please Bristol. Prentiss initially reported, "Many of us personally saw—and are ready to affirm the statement—Turkish soldiers, often directed by officers, throwing petroleum in the houses and streets."⁸⁹ A week later he ignored his own eyewitness testimony and its implications and propounded the general conclusion Bristol favored: that the Turks were not responsible for the fire.⁹⁰

Similarly, Barnes reported "I myself saw two Turkish soldiers spreading kerosene along the street in front of the Consulate." He also reported the Turks had proved themselves "capable of a vandalism essentially medieval," and supported that assertion with personal observations. He described gangs of Turks hunting Armenians, including "boys of no more than 12 or 13 years of age, each with his club." He witnessed "one of these groups fall upon an Armenian and club him to death," a "proceeding... brutal beyond belief.... I do not believe there was a bone unbroken in the body." He saw three Armenians summarily shot to death and watched Armenians and Greeks "collected in groups by the military authorities and marched out of the city to face firing squads." He

noted that "every seven homes in ten in [the Armenian] quarter had been entered, looted, and in many of them the inhabitants killed;" that some Armenians "were deliberately barred by the Turks from leaving the fire area and were thus disposed of" (i.e., burned to death); and that many "threw themselves into the sea" finding suicide better than the alternatives. He noted that on September 15th "deportations to the interior were commenced," and that "perhaps 40,000 have been started on their grim march."⁹¹

Despite all that and more, Barnes, like Prentiss, ignored his own testimony to make unsubstantiated conclusions Bristol favored. He denied there were massacres, thought only 1-2,000 Armenians and Greeks had been killed, and expressed certainty that the city "was not fired by order of the authorities or with their cognizance." He does not explain how he squared his low death toll with his observation that most houses in the Armenian quarter were destroyed along with many of the 20,000 or so inhabitants and that 40,000 Greeks had been marched off to certain death, nor how he knew Turkish authorities had no idea what their soldiers were doing. Instead, he peddled the same preposterous line Prentiss promoted: that Turkish soldiers saw the fire, spontaneously took the initiative to extend and direct it with copious amounts of flammable liquids, and did so without the knowledge, approval, and direction of their superiors.

But Gauin shared none of that with his readers. Instead, he selectively quoted Prentiss and Barnes as if their later conclusions, which contradicted their initial reports, were credible. Gauin also falsely accused Horton and Dobkin of bias for practicing good scholarship. He notes they acknowledge "Greek threats to burn Izmir" but then let the matter drop, which is false.⁹² Both Horton and Dobkin reported rather than ignored such rumors, but they were equally forthright in making the case that this fear never materialized. Instead, first Greek forces and then Greek gendarmes evacuated the city, leaving it defenseless and undisturbed. Turkish forces arrived and were in total control of the city for five days of looting, rape, and murder before the fires started. Horton and Dobkin did not ignore the issue; instead they proved the rumors never became a reality. Gauin goes beyond misusing sources to wild, evidence-free conjecture. For example, he cites the sudden evacuation of American and British citizens as proof that Horton and the British consul must have known "in advance the danger to the city because of the Armenian or Greek arsonist organizations."⁹³ The British and Americans communities only evacuated after several of their citizens had been killed. The British were on the verge of war with Turkey, and Horton only succeeded in persuading Admiral Bristol to reverse his policy of no American evacuation on the day the fires were started.⁹⁴ There is no evidence that "Greco-Armenian gangs" even existed, much less that British or American consuls knew about them and that such knowledge drove their decisions to evacuate. On the contrary, and again, as even pro-Turk observers agree, there was no organized resistance

to the Turkish occupation and the Turks were in total control of the city when the fire started.

Gauin then dips even further into pure fiction, arguing the “racist” Horton “falsely attributed” the city’s destruction to Turks “to hide his own responsibility, as he avoided warning any authority about the Greco–Armenian gangs.”⁹⁵ It was not Horton’s job to advise Turkish military leaders on security, but if it had been, he would have been obliged to implore them to constrain their soldiers. Gauin claims Horton’s request to negotiate an amnesty proves Horton wanted the Greco-Armenian arsonists to get away unpunished. It proves nothing of the sort. By all accounts, Horton’s behaviors, as well as his request that he be allowed to negotiate with Turkish leaders, were motivated by a desire to avoid unnecessary bloodshed and destruction. Everything in the official records, as well as other participant testimonies, indicates Horton was concerned about saving lives. Instead of proving “the innocence of the Kemalist authorities” in setting the fires, Gauin’s fantastic, evidence-free conjectures undermine his own credibility.

The Truth Will Out

A favorite Horton aphorism was “the truth will out.” One of the many times he used it was in a warning to the Department of State: “No pro-Turk propaganda can obscure what occurred in Smyrna,” he insisted, “there were too many reliable witnesses. The truth is sure to come out.”⁹⁶ That happened, but too slowly for a frustrated Horton. In the first draft of his book, he wondered why those responsible did not have the courage to make their case for genocidal homogenization honestly. The Turks burned “infidel Smyrna,” he wrote, to expunge the center of Greek culture and industry in Asia Minor:

*That is the truth and there are many who can see the Turkish point of view and even sympathize with it. Why should not we and why should not the Turks be courageous enough to speak the truth? Let us say the Turks did right, if you wish, and that we and the world at large will be the gainers, but let us not defame the sufferers.*⁹⁷

Surprisingly, what Horton requested finally happened in 2005 when Turkish scholar, Biray Kirli published her article, “Forgetting the Smyrna Fire.”⁹⁸ Kirli made the usual disparaging remarks about Horton and Western scholarship,⁹⁹ and added her own false claims.¹⁰⁰ But to her credit, she told the truth about Smyrna. Kirli interviewed elderly Smyrniotes, most of whom blamed the fire on Greeks and Armenians, as they were taught in school. But as she notes, they invariably reversed the order of events, asserting the Turkish army arrived *after* the fire started, since there was no other way to explain how the fire began and spread so rapidly.¹⁰¹ Two of her interviewees also admitted how and why Turkish troops

started the fires. After initially saying it was to “clamp down on continuing resistance,” one told her “I think the real reason was to prevent them from coming back.” The other was even more direct, telling her “it was the Turkish troops who burned the city” because “We did not want them to come back; and with their shops and houses burnt down where were they going to return to?”¹⁰² Kirli cites other sources (army veterans and the prominent journalist, Falih Rifki Atay) who acknowledged Turkish soldiers torched the city and massacred inhabitants, and who offered the same explanation for why they did so.¹⁰³ From all these sources Kirli concludes:

*...the cosmopolitan port city, could have no place in the new nation being created under the slogan: ‘Turkey belongs to Turks’. The old Izmir belonged to Levantines, Greeks, Armenians, Jews, and Muslims. [It had to be] remade and remapped for the construction of Turkish nationalism and the formation of the Turkish nation-state. This remaking and remapping involved a process of erasure.... The eradication was both literally and symbolically violent. By burning Izmir the nationalists were chastising infidel Izmir. Flames devoured the cosmopolitan, hence decadent, impure culture of the city. When the black clouds cleared, Izmir had undergone a moral improvement; it was purified.*¹⁰⁴

It took eighty years, but someone finally had the courage to make a case that Kemal’s Turkification program included the burning and ethnic cleansing of Smyrna. Rather than blaming the victims of mass murder and rape for burning the city, Kirli justified these crimes against humanity as acts of “purification.” In doing so, she confirmed Horton’s explanation for why Smyrna was burned.¹⁰⁵

The truth has come out and not just from Kirli’s admissions. In the past decade or so scholars using diverse primary sources have substantiated all the main historical arguments in Horton’s book, *The Blight of Asia*.¹⁰⁶ Horton argued a succession of Turkish governments over several decades pursued a policy of Turkey for the Turks that included the mass extermination and ethnic cleansing of the native Christian population.¹⁰⁷ In 2019 two Israeli scholars, Benny Morris and Dror Ze’evi, published *The Thirty-Year Genocide: Turkey’s Destruction of Its Christian Minorities*, which made precisely that point. Using declassified national archives in the United States, Europe and Turkey, they conclude it is “incontrovertible” that the Turks pursued the genocide and ethnic cleansing of all Christians over three decades.¹⁰⁸ They demonstrate, along with other recent, authoritative sources,¹⁰⁹ that Turkish leaders planned, orchestrated, and executed these atrocities not in response to sedition,¹¹⁰ a charge often levied against the Christian minorities by Turkish sources, but as Horton argued, to “de-Christianize” Asia Minor. They conclude that from 1894-1924 the Turks “murdered, straightforwardly or indirectly, through privation and

disease, between 1.5 and 2.5 million Christians,"¹¹¹ reducing their Christian minorities from 20 to 2 percent of the population.¹¹²

Horton has been accused of exaggerating the horrors at Smyrna, which Winston Churchill described as "a deliberately planned and methodically executed atrocity" with "few parallels in the history of human crime."¹¹³ But Horton actually understated the atrocities in deference to the reader sensibilities of his era. Using much greater primary documentation than Horton had available, Morris and Ze'evi agree with Horton that the genocides were executed with unspeakable cruelties, which they graphically describe:

Many of the murdered Christians were killed with knives, bayonets, axes, and stones; thousands were burned alive...; tens of thousands of women and girls were gang-raped and murdered; clerics were crucified; and thousands of Christian dignitaries were tortured—eyes gouged out, noses and ears cut off, feet turned to mush—before being executed. In terms of the behavior of the perpetrators, on the level of individual actions, the Turkish massacre of the Christians was far more sadistic than the Nazi murder of the Jews.¹¹⁴

Horton was also right about the dominant role Islam and Islamic leaders played in the terror,¹¹⁵ and right about Bristol and his fake news and false reports and the Department of State's coverup of the Turkish atrocities.¹¹⁶ Recent research also substantiates many other points Horton made in *The Blight of Asia*.

For example, Horton argued Turkish determination to get rid of the Christians persisted even after the Turkish government signed the Mudros armistice ending WWI.¹¹⁷ Yet many historians ignore this and mischaracterize the Greek occupation of Smyrna as an unprovoked "invasion,"¹¹⁸ falsely claiming it precipitated Turkish resistance.¹¹⁹ There was no invasion, and the Greek presence did not precipitate Turkish resistance. Turkish nationalists were resisting the Allied occupation of their defeated country throughout early 1919 and prior to the arrival of Greek forces. They blocked Allied efforts to return stolen property and people abducted from their families, stockpiled weapons, planned guerilla operations, and encouraged irregular forces to attack Christian villages.¹²⁰ In May, Allied leaders requested Greek forces do the same occupation duties that American, British, and French troops were doing in occupied post-war Germany and other defeated Central Powers. Horton and other regional experts recommended against it, knowing the Ottomans had terrorized their Greek Ottoman citizens before and during WWI. Yet, Allied leaders, under severe public pressure to demobilize their large armies, thought sending Greek troops was the best of a bad set of options.

Having made that decision, the Allies botched the landing, forcing the Greeks to go ashore alone instead of in joint Allied military patrols. They did this even though Allied

military leaders on the scene knew the local Turkish governor was planning an ambush, which is what happened. Turkish authorities released inmates from prison,¹²¹ armed them,¹²² and had them attack the arriving Greek forces.¹²³ Horton reported the resultant Greek atrocities and criticized them harshly, but he also noted the scale of violence was greatly exaggerated,¹²⁴ erroneously blamed on the Greeks,¹²⁵ and that the Greeks quickly stabilized the situation with no help from their supposed Allies or local Turkish authorities.¹²⁶

Thus, as Horton noted in a letter to a friend, the fighting in Anatolia was a continuation of WWI, fought to determine whether the peace treaty terms imposed by the Allies and signed by Turkish leaders would be honored. It was not a "Greco-Turkish War," as it is widely mischaracterized.¹²⁷ Horton was also right in asserting the Greek administration of the Smyrna district, on the whole, was benign and advantageous to all residents, including Turks.¹²⁸ In contrast, the Turkish Nationalists, like many insurgent forces throughout history, used atrocities to elicit harsh countermeasures they hoped would incline the population to support their cause.¹²⁹ A case can be made that multiple factors explain the great disparity in Greek and Turkish behaviors, but their fundamentally different objectives played a large role. The Greeks were trying to make a case for their ability to govern well and win international sympathy for their claim to parts of the Anatolian coast, whereas Turkish Nationalists were trying to secure as much territory as possible, drive out the Christians, and wear down superior Allied forces.

Finally, as Kirli admits, Horton was also right about who burned Smyrna and why they did so.¹³⁰ Horton also correctly revealed Western complicity in covering up the genocides, and rightly argued the Lausanne treaties should be defeated because they rewarded mass murder.¹³¹ He was right about Greece being betrayed by its WWI allies,¹³² who believed they were acting in their own self-interest, but actually did themselves, Europe and the whole world a great deal of harm.¹³³ Genocide scholars have greatly lamented the precedent set by the genocides in Asia Minor, and Europe later paid a horrific price for rewarding rather than punishing those behaviors.

Why it all Matters

Horton matters because the truth about the destruction of Smyrna matters, and Smyrna matters because it was a culminating, telltale event that explains the Christian genocides in Asia Minor and the failure of the Western powers to punish those responsible. That failure matters because it set the stage for even worse atrocities a little more than two decades later. After WWI, Germans debated the genocide in Asia Minor. Some condemned Germany's role in supporting Turkey. Others admired the Turks for

rejecting the post-war treaties, defeating the Allies, and wiping out "internal enemies," all of which was not punished but rather rewarded by the Allies with treaties of commerce and friendship. When the Nazis came to power, they emulated the Turkish model of genocide and conducted the mass murder of Jews and other "undesirables."¹³⁴

The world is better off today because Germans acknowledge their history and their responsibility for repentance and restitution, and worse off because the Turks have not done the same. Turkey is worse off too, for reasons Horton articulated. He considered Turkey's genocides self-inflicted wounds. He thought it was in Turkey's self-interest to embrace freedom of speech and religion as bedrock civil liberties. The "Turkey for the Turks" vision of a religiously homogenous nation doomed the possibility of a liberal, diverse, Turkey where truth and the ability to speak it are protected. Horton believed Asia Minor had a naturally bountiful geography, and that the presence of Christian minorities would elevate the country so long as the government ensured a level playing field for everyone. "Had this conception proved true," Horton wrote, "Turkey would today [1927] be one of the great, progressive, prosperous countries of the world."¹³⁵

Horton considered it necessary "for the honor of the Turkish race that some of its members should denounce the massacres" and "publicly declare that they are and have always been opposed to them."¹³⁶ This eventually happened and would have pleased Horton,¹³⁷ but it has not happened enough to guarantee Turkish citizens their freedoms. The real war for Turkish liberty is ongoing and the liberals are losing. Turkey's leaders have embraced neo-Ottoman aspirations, repressed the liberties of Turkish citizens, and threatened adjoining countries in hopes of retaking territories liberated from Ottoman rule in World War I. Thus, Horton has proved prophetic insofar as Turkish prosperity rose when its leaders instituted secular and liberal reforms and then declined more recently after Turkey reverted to a more authoritarian, Islamist, and aggressive government.¹³⁸

In conclusion, Horton deserves careful reconsideration by historians, and from some, he is owed an apology. He revered truth,¹³⁹ and made every effort to report it. There is no evidence Horton ever lied or misrepresented a situation. On the contrary, modern scholarship substantiates all the major points he made in *The Blight of Asia*. Some will not agree with all his views on Turkish history and culture, or his evaluation of Islam, but fair-minded people will acknowledge he offered historical facts and reasoned arguments for his opinions. More than that, they will see that he was a Christian humanitarian who practiced what he preached. He was more than tolerant; he was beneficent, over long periods of time repeatedly assisting suffering people of all ethnicities and religions, including Turkish Muslims.

When considering Horton's historical significance, the combined import of all the issues he was right about is highly significant; enough to encourage major reevaluations

of the interwar period in Asia Minor and its far-reaching effects. His accurate depiction of genocide and ethnic cleansing alone is noteworthy. Arguably, nothing historians do is more important than reporting genocide accurately and explaining its causes, which is what Horton did. Besides correcting history and explaining genocide, Horton's policy prescriptions also remain relevant and worthy of consideration. His insistence that American foreign policy required a moral foundation remains a relevant issue in our tumultuous world where, sadly, genocide and ethnic cleansing are still prominent features. The world might have avoided much needless suffering if Horton's reporting and policy prescriptions had been heeded a century ago. Acknowledging that could help us avoid similar horrors in the future.

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¹ For how the Turks used deception and propaganda to hide their culpability see Benny Morris and Dror Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide: Turkey's Destruction of Its Christian Minorities, 1894–1924* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2019): 276, 404–405, 411–413, 417, 423, 426–427, 439, and 456.

² Hatzidimitriou first exposed the Department of State cover up in a 2005 book and reinforced that conclusion later in a 2012 book chapter. He emphasized the importance of not just remembering but documenting the Christian genocides in Asia Minor and specifically noted the importance of gathering and publishing the diaries and personal papers of eyewitnesses like George Horton. Constantine G. Hatzidimitriou, *American Accounts Documenting the Destruction of Smyrna by the Kemalist Turkish Forces: September 1922* (New York: Aristide D. Caratzas, Melissa International, 2005); and "The Destruction of Smyrna in 1922" in George Shirinian, ed., *The Asia Minor Catastrophe and the Ottoman Greek Genocide: Essays on Asia Minor, Pontos, and Eastern Thrace, 1913–1923* (Bloomingdale, IL: Asia Minor and Pontos Hellenic Research Center, 2012).

³ For example, French officials torpedoed a summer of 1922 Allied investigation into Turkish atrocities. Ismini Lamb and Christopher Lamb, *The Gentle American: George Horton's Odyssey and His True Account of the Smyrna Catastrophe* (Gorgias Press, 2022): 241.

⁴ Ibid: 322.

⁵ The most notable such source at the time was Edward H. Bierstadt, *The Great Betrayal: A Survey of the Near East Problem* (New York: Robert M. McBride & Co, 1924).

⁶ Lou Ureneck, *The Great Fire: One American's Mission to Rescue Victims of the 20th Century's First Genocide* (New York: Harpers-Collins Publishers, 2015), p. 42.

⁷ Ibid: 37.

⁸ See, for example, Dr. Constantine G. Hatzidimitriou, "The Continuing Value of *The Blight of Asia* by George Horton: An Assessment After Ninety-six Years," *American Journal of Contemporary Hellenic Issues*, Vol. 13, Spring 2022.

⁹ See Dobkin's description of him and Georgelin's and Milton's cites of Horton. Dobkin updated her book in 1988 and it has been reprinted several times since, and she also has an article comparing Horton and Bristol: *Smyrna 1922: The Destruction of a City* (Newmark Press, New York, 1998): 124, and Marjorie Housepian, "George Horton and Mark L. Bristol: Opposing forces in U.S. foreign policy 1919-1923." *Bulletin of the Centre for Asia Minor Studies*, V. 4, pp.131-158, Jan. 1983; Herve Georgelin, *La Fin de Smyrne: Du Cosmopolitisme aux Nationalismes* (Paris, CNRS Editions, 2005); Giles Milton, *Paradise Lost, Smyrna 1922: The Destruction of Islam's City of Tolerance* (London: Sceptre, 2009).

¹⁰ For convenience, we will refer to Western and Turkish scholars and scholarship even though there are exceptions. Some Turkish scholars like Taner Akcam, who now lives in the United States, agree with Horton's main arguments, and some Western scholars, who have lived in Turkey and are affiliated with Turkish institutions, like Justin McCarthy and Heath Lowry, side with the Turkish government positions.

¹¹ For example, Gauin, writing in 2017, claims "the most important witness for the allegation against the Turkish side, in the books of Ms. Housepian, Mr. Milton and other publications, is American Consul George Horton," whom he pillories for "racist prejudices" that "are quite obvious." Maxime Gauin, "Revisiting the Fire of Izmir," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 1, Fall 2017: 33-53.

¹² Lamb and Lamb, *The Gentle American*: 512; see the index list of this and other Bristol attacks on Horton.

¹³ Peter Michael Buzanski, "Admiral Bristol and Turkish-American Relations, 1919-1922." Dissertation, University of California, 1960: 176.

¹⁴ Horton did not suffer a breakdown, resign, or spend the rest of his life writing such books. See Lamb and Lamb, *The Gentle American*, esp. 323, 476n104, and the epilogue.

¹⁵ Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922*. Darwin Press: Princeton, NJ, 1995: 317.

¹⁶ Corinna Tsakiridou, "Ideology, Prejudice and Ethnic Conflict in George Horton's *The Blight of Asia*: A Radical Narrative Reconsidered." *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 25:1 (Spring 2001): 21-22.

¹⁷ Hakan Gungor, "A Critic of American Diplomat in izmir: George Horton and His Observation" *History Studies: International Journal of History*, Volume 10 Issue 3, April 2018: 66, 76. David Roessel also asserted in passing, with no evidence, that Horton "tended to be anti-Turkish" and employ "anti-Turkish rhetoric." David Roessel, *In Byron's Shadow: Modern Greece in the English and American Imagination: Modern Greece in the English and American Imagination*. Oxford University Press, 2001: 327-8.

¹⁸ Brian Coleman, "George Horton: The Literary Diplomat," *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*, Volume 30, Number 1, January 2006: 81.

¹⁹ Ibid: 81, 93.

²⁰ For example, Cassamatis lauds Horton for remaining "undaunted" by the fire, writing "he moved his headquarters to an adjoining building and continued his work without interruption." This is not true. Louis P. Cassimatis, *American Influence in Greece, 1917-1929* (Ashland: Kent State University Press, 2012): 254fn8.

²¹ Jennings misrepresents Horton in a 2010 article and a 2015 book, and elsewhere in interviews. See Roger Jennings, "One Man Changed Greece and Turkey Forever," *American Diplomacy*, March 2010, and Roger L. Jennings, *Waking the Lion* (Xulon Press: 2015): 100-101. For other Jennings' falsehoods see Lamb and Lamb, *The Gentle American*. 505n94.

²² For example, see Dobkin, *Smyrna 1922*, p. 111; and Ureneck, *The Great Fire*, p. 69.

²³ Ismini and Chris Lamb, "Honoring Diplomats Punished for Doing their Job Well: The Case of George Horton," *American Diplomacy*, May 2023; and Lamb and Lamb, *The Gentle American*. 505n94.

²⁴ Lamb and Lamb, *The Gentle American*. 96, 102, 142, 194-6, 447n57, 458nn6-7, 469n20.

²⁵ Ibid: 102, 142, 194-96, 447n57, 458n7, 469n20.

²⁶ McCarthy also asserted "Horton was of the opinion that the Turks should never be allowed to return to the areas taken by the Greeks." As we demonstrate in Horton's biography, this is a repetition of a knowingly false allegation Bristol made. Another example is Tsakiridou, who claimed Horton's reporting on the Greek retreat relied "exclusively on a single eyewitness testimony by missionary Dana Getchell." This is patently false, as Horton shared reports from multiple other British and American eyewitnesses. See also note 21 on Roger Jennings' disinformation. Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922*. Darwin Press: Princeton, NJ, 1995: 317; Tsakiridou, "Ideology, Prejudice and Ethnic Conflict in George Horton's *The Blight of Asia*": 33; Lamb and Lamb, *The Gentle American*. 187-191, 258, 267; and Lamb and Lamb, "Honoring Diplomats Punished for Doing their Job Well."

²⁷ On Horton not being pro-Greek in the sense of prejudiced, see Lamb and Lamb, *The Gentle American*, 210-11, 359-60, and for some of his criticisms of Greeks, see pp. 137-9, 145-7, 203, 204-5, 210-1, 329-30, 344, 387-8, 410.

²⁸ Buzanski, "Admiral Bristol and Turkish-American Relations": 176.

²⁹ Bristol was even in favor of letting the refugees from Turkey starve to death. He slowed, reduced, and blocked aid to refugees. Lamb and Lamb, *The Gentle American*. 265-6, 322-3, 326-7, 328-9, 330-1, 333-4, 481n70.

³⁰ Ibid: 48-49, 55, 162.

³¹ Ibid: 283 and George Horton, "Lausanne Pact Scored: Reservations Before Ratification By U.S. Are Urged," *The Evening Star*, January 10, 1927.

³² Horton made other laudatory comments about Muslim civilization too. George Horton, *The Blight of Asia: An Account of the Systematic Extermination of Christian Populations by Mohammedans and of the Culpability of Certain Great Powers; with the True Story of the Burning of Smyrna* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1926): pp. 25, 238, 254-55, 261.

³³ Horton, *The Blight of Asia*, p. 256.

³⁴ Horton, *The Blight of Asia*: 28.

³⁵ Ibid: 209, 241.

³⁶ Besides the authorities Horton cited, see for example, Lord Robert Cecil, "Why the Turks Must Go," *Evening Standard*, London, Monday, February 23, 1920. Cecil argued individual Turks ("especially the uneducated") had "many qualities" that were attractive "but as a Government and nation" had "almost nothing to their credit": "no science, no literature, no art, except perhaps, an architecture which some admire. Their rule has been marked by almost complete stagnation varied by occasional outbursts of cruelty and slaughter."

³⁷ Ibid: 255; Morris and Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*, 496-499.

³⁸ Lamb and Lamb, *The Gentle American*. 329.

³⁹ Hatzidimitriou also found Horton's depiction of Islam "unrestrained and extreme," even though he acknowledged Horton "was also a highly sensitive and caring individual who cared deeply... about the suffering, injustice, and tragedy he saw around him no matter what race or religion was being victimized." He qualified this overall assessment, however, by noting it was based on "the evidence we currently have." Since then, Horton's biography has been published and we believe in demonstrates Horton's religious assessments in *The Blight of Asia* were based on historical facts, as he asserted, and in that regard, were not extreme views. The biography also documents Horton's wide-ranging personal humanitarian interventions, which in our view prove he was not bigoted. See Marjorie Housepian, "George Horton and Mark L. Bristol: Opposing Forces in U.S. Foreign Policy, 1919-1923," p. 147; Hatzidimitriou, "The Continuing Value of *The Blight of Asia* by George Horton," p. 10-11; and the index pages that enumerate all Horton's humanitarian interventions in Lamb and Lamb, *The Gentle American*. 520-21.

⁴⁰ Horton devoted the first appendix in *The Blight of Asia* to accounts of ongoing persecution since the fall of Smyrna. Horton, *The Blight of Asia*, pp. 285ff. For the quotes on the religious nature of Turkish persecution, see Morris and Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*, pp. 491, 493-496.

⁴¹ He made this point repeatedly in both *The Blight of Asia* and in editorials. See George Horton, "The Turkish Attitude Toward Christianity," *The Christian Science Monitor*, April 26, 1926; and "Turkey at the Bar," *The Literary Digest*, May 29, 1926: 30-31.

⁴² Dobkin (married name, Housepian), Hatzidimitriou, and Marketos are a few of the rare scholars who thoroughly read Horton's book and recognized Christians were Horton's main audience. As Hatzidimitriou noted, "Horton was deeply concerned about the future of Christianity" and "Christian missionaries and their supporters were the primary audience to whom he had to appeal." Marjorie Housepian, "George Horton and Mark L. Bristol: Opposing Forces in U.S. Foreign Policy, 1919-1923," p. 147; James L. Marketos, "George Horton: An American Witness in Smyrna," AHI Noon Forum, September 14, 2006; and Hatzidimitriou, "The Continuing Value of *The Blight of Asia* by George Horton," p. 7.

⁴³ Horton, *The Blight of Asia*: 284.

⁴⁴ Ibid: 229.

⁴⁵ Lamb and Lamb, *The Gentle American*, 374.

⁴⁶ Horton, *The Blight of Asia*: 240.

⁴⁷ Ibid, pp. 520-521.

⁴⁸ Ibid, pp. 150, 452n38. Thus, McCarthy's assertion that Turks in Smyrna considered Horton prejudiced is also false (see the discussion of McCarthy above).

⁴⁹ This letter is in *The Blight of Asia* but also documented in the U.S. national archives and Horton's personal correspondence. Lamb and Lamb, *The Gentle American*, 370.

⁵⁰ Horton, *The Blight of Asia*, 279.

⁵¹ In addition to Dobkin's *Smyrna 1922*, there is Georgelin's *La Fin de Smyrne*, Milton's *Paradise Lost*, and Ureneck's *The Great Fire*.

⁵² General Anastasios Papoulas, knowing what was in store for Greek Ottomans, resigned because the Greek government decided against arming the populace. Lamb and Lamb, *The Gentle American*, 230, 240.

⁵³ This includes Bristol's officers, Americans with Turkish business partners like Charles Griswold, etc. The same is true of modern scholars like Resat Kasaba, who tried to mitigate Turkish culpability by blaming the widespread violence in Smyrna on both Greek and Turkish "nationalism," but had to admit "neither the nationalist government nor its army was very effective or interested in preventing the persecution of Greeks and Armenians or protecting" them. See Lamb and Lamb, *The Gentle American*, 293-94, 317, 350, 480n48;

Resat Kasaba, "Izmir 1922: A Port City Unravels," in Fawaz Leila Tarazi et al. *Modernity and Culture: From the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean*. Columbia University Press 2002: 222.

⁵⁴ Lamb and Lamb, *The Gentle American*, 321-2, 381.

⁵⁵ Georgelin notes how odd it would be for Christian arsonists to ignite their own homes but not those of their Turkish oppressors. In contrast,

The burning, the massacres, the deportations and the expulsions from the territory of Turkey provide a definitive solution to the Greek Orthodox problem on the Aegean shores, in its two dimensions inside and outside Turkey. Close-knit Christian populations, who had always desired and knew how to preserve their political and cultural self-esteem within the Ottoman Empire, were eliminated [and their economic] superiority...destroyed forever.

Georgelin, *La Fin de Smyrne*, 180-81.

⁵⁶ The destruction of churches was reported by Mark Prentiss, a pro-Bristol man who was feeding stories to the *New York Times*, and Maynard Barnes, Horton's vice consul who was otherwise giving Bristol the news he wanted to hear. Lamb and Lamb, *The Gentle American*, pp. 317 and p. 480n43.

⁵⁷ Lamb and Lamb, *The Gentle American*, p. 329.

⁵⁸ Heath W. Lowry, "Turkish History: On Whose Sources Will It Be Based? A Case Study on the Burning of Izmir," in *Osmanli Arastxrmalari- The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, Istanbul; vol. IX, 1989, pp. 1-29.

⁵⁹ Milton, *Paradise Lost*, pp. 307-308.

⁶⁰ Lowry, "Turkish History: On Whose Sources Will It Be Based?" pp. 16-17.

⁶¹ Morris and Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*, pp. 276, 404-405, 411-413, 417, 423, 426-427, 439, and 456.

⁶² Telegraph from Admiral Mark Bristol to Secretary of State, August 2, 1921.

⁶³ Lamb and Lamb, pp. 220, 232, 321, 466n112; and Herve Georgelin, *La Fin de Smyrne: Du Cosmopolitisme aux Nationalismes* (Paris, CNRS Editions, 2005), p. 178.

⁶⁴ Morris and Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: 276.

⁶⁵ For a sober comparison of relative Greek and Turkish atrocities see Morris and Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*, 480-484.

⁶⁶ William Stearns Davis, "Expulsion of Dr. Fisher is Said to Reveal Angora's Attitude," *The New York Times*, September 2, 1924, p. 18; Ralph Harlow to George Horton, September 22, 1925; W.L. Geddes, President, MacAndrews and Forbes Co., to George Horton, September 28, 1926.

⁶⁷ Susan Blair received threats for publishing an account of the Armenian genocide she came across in the U.S. archives written by American consul, Leslie A. Davis. She went into hiding. More recently, the Federation of Turkish-American Associations mounted a letter campaign to have one of the authors of this article, Ismini Lamb, fired by Georgetown University for reporting her research findings on George Horton. They claimed she was promoting racial hatred by telling the truth about Smyrna. Leslie A. Davis and Susan Blair, *The Slaughterhouse Province: An American Diplomat's Report on the Armenian Genocide, 1915-1917*. New Rochelle, N.Y: A.D. Caratzas, Orpheus Pub, 1989; Kate McKenna, "Account of Armenian Massacre Provokes Diplomatic Storm," *The New York Times*, December 3, 1989, Section LI, p. 12; and Paul Farhi, "Haunted By An Old Horror A Family's Ordeal," *Washington Post*, May 26, 1991.

⁶⁸ Lamb and Lamb, *The Gentle American*, pp. 154, 160-1, 218-9, 246, 289, 345, 469n168.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.* For Bristol's false reporting on Ismid, see pp. 218-9, 461n88; on Marash, pp. 173-76; on Pontus, pp. 220-1, 231, 238-40, 338-9; on Smyrna, pp. 281, 291, 302, 326; and on Turkish massacres in general, pp. 81, 240, 343, 486n41, 462n98.

⁷⁰ Ibid: pp. 220, 222, 240, 249, 264, 280, 283, 291, 314-7, 332, 336-7, 348, 381, 385, 457n45, 476nn112.123, 486nn40.41.

⁷¹ Ibid: pp. 186-7, 219-20, 249, 302, 385. Bristol's false reports remain useful to Turkish historians to this day. For an example of recent Turkish scholarship using quotes from Bristol to buttress official Turkish history while ignoring all other evidence, see Elcin Yilmaz, "The United States of America Attitude in the Process Leading to the Liberation of Izmir," *Journal of Modern Turkish History Studies*, (2022): 5-34.

⁷² Georgelin mines the French archives, demonstrating the weakness in Admiral Dumesnil's reports and the veracity of Michel Graillet, the French consul, who like Horton, testified that the Turks set fire to the city and was punished by his superiors for doing so. See also Louis Martini, who agrees with Georgelin, and Horton for that matter. Herve Georgelin, *La Fin de Smyrne: Du Cosmopolitisme aux Nationalismes* (Paris, CNRS Editions, 2005): pp. 175-76; Louis Francois Martini, *Le Crepuscule des Levantins de Smyrne: Etude Historique d'une Communaute* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2013): 154-58.

⁷³ Taner Akcam, a Turkish scholar, argues, "there is no real contradiction between the material in Ottoman and various Western archives, despite frequent and ongoing claims to the contrary. All documentary sources, from their varied perspectives, attest to the same historical facts." Taner Akcam, *The Young Turks' Crime against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire*. Princeton University Press, 2012, p. 450. See also Taner Akcam, *Killing Orders: Talat Pasha's Telegrams and the Armenian Genocide* (London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

⁷⁴ Morris and Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*, 7.

⁷⁵ For example, see notes 69-71 for examples of Bristol's disinformation.

⁷⁶ Giles Milton, for example, made a point of relying on Levantine sources who hoped to remain in Turkey and continue their prosperous existence. See his "Note of Sources" at the beginning of his book. Other Western sources also self-consciously examine the credibility of their sources, and that includes Dobkin. See the comments in her introduction and bibliography.

⁷⁷ For just two sets of examples, see Lamb and Lamb, *The Gentle American*, pp. 411, 458n7, 469n6, 471n62, and 505n94; and in Robert Shenk, *America's Black Sea Fleet: The U.S. Navy Amidst War and Revolution 1919-1923*. Naval Institute Press, 2017: pp. 293n79, 303n2, 305-6n36, 323n2, 323-4n3.

⁷⁸ For example, Kirli dismisses "existing scholarship" on Smyrna as "both very thin and biased." She dismisses those she claims, "base their arguments that the Turkish army started the fire on a book by the American Consul George Horton" and cites Dobkin's book as "based largely on the sources utilized by Horton." As Shenk comments, this assertion is transparently false. Similarly, Gauin claimed at the time of his writing (2017) that there were no definitive accounts of Smyrna's destruction and that Heath Lowry's 1989 article is the best source on the topic in a Western language. There were by 2017 several good book-length accounts of Smyrna's destruction (Horton, Dobkin, and Milton), and the problems with Lowry's scholarship are amply revealed below. Biray Kolluoğlu Kirli, "Forgetting the Smyrna Fire," *History Workshop Journal*, Issue 60, Autumn 2005, Oxford University Press, p. 30; Gauin, "Revisiting the Fire of Izmir," p. 7.

⁷⁹ For example, Gauin repeats almost verbatim Lowry's false argument that Hepburn's testimony negated Barnes eyewitness account of Turkish soldiers spreading flammable liquids.

⁸⁰ See also Hlamides' discussion of scholarship that follows the official government history and policy, particularly Lowry, McCarthy, and Stanford Shaw who "have been severely criticized for their failure to maintain accepted standards of scholarship." Nikolaos Hlamides, "The Smyrna Holocaust: The Final Phase of the Greek Genocide," in Tessa Hofmann et al. *The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks: Studies on the State-Sponsored Campaign of Extermination of the Christians of Asia Minor 1912-1922 and Its Aftermath: History Law Memory* (Aristide D. Caratzas: 2011): 226.

⁸¹ Lowry, "Turkish History: On Whose Sources Will It Be Based?" p. 13.

⁸² As Shenk notes, Grescovich was an "interested witness" given he was the fire chief of a city utterly destroyed by fire. Robert Shenk, *America's Black Sea Fleet: The U.S. Navy Amidst War and Revolution 1919-1923*. Naval Institute Press, 2017: p. 328n94.

⁸³ For another assessment that Lowry's scholarship was "not credible," see Shenk, *America's Black Sea Fleet*, p. 389n27.

⁸⁴ For example, Lowry also disputed work by scholars who documented the pro-Turkish sympathies of Bristol's intelligence officer, Lt. Robert Steed Dunn. Peter Buzanski, in his sympathetic biography of Bristol, argued Bristol made a huge mistake relying on Dunn, whose reports were "the result more of barroom gossip than of serious intelligence gathering." Lowry insists Dunn authored "well-balanced, often brilliant analyses," ignoring the internal Department of State records that document the opposite and Buzanski's compelling evidence that Dunn skewed the Allied commission report on the Greek occupation of Smyrna. Lowry also denies Dunn was fired, unaware that his own article's appendix proves it. An internal memo from Harry Dwight to Warren Robbins argues Dunn was untrustworthy, and an internal memo from Robbins to Robert Woods Bliss, Third Assistant Secretary of State, who at the time was responsible for "all administrative matters" in the Department, suggests Dunn be transferred back to the Navy. This action was approved with notations of "Ok," "do it personally," and Robbins' indicating he acted: "Telegram sent" and "done, WR Oct 11/21" [WR being Warren Robbins]. Dunn was then transferred back to the Navy Department. See Lowry, Heath W. *Richard G. Hovannisian on Lieutenant Robert Steed Dunn: A Review Note* (Istanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basimevi, 1986): 221-222; Buzanski, "Admiral Bristol and Turkish-American Relations," 71-74, 258n155; Lamb and Lamb, *The Gentle American*, 154, 160-1, 218-9, 246, 289, 345, 461-2n95, 462n96, 469n168.

⁸⁵ Maxime Gauin, "Revisiting the Fire of Izmir," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 1, Fall 2017: 33-53.

⁸⁶ Gauin asserts Greek forces committed "every kind of crime: pillages, rapes, assassinations and massacres." He neglects to mention the bloody melee was instigated by a Turkish ambush. Gauin, "Revisiting the Fire of Izmir," 8.

⁸⁷ Georgelin, *La Fin de Smyrne*, 175. Here is the passage in French:

Tous les rapports signés par Graillet affirment au contraire que la responsabilité de l'incendie incombe aux Turcs: "l'incendie [...] allumé aux dires des Frères par des soldats turcs qui auraient arrosé le quartier arménien de pétrole et de matières combustibles." Certains courriers diplomatiques français ultérieurs affirment que Graillet est finalement convaincu per la thèse turque officielle. Mais aucun document signé de sa main ne vient confirmer ces affirmations.

⁸⁸ Lamb and Lamb, *The Gentle American*. For Prentiss' relationship with Bristol see pp. 249, 273, 274, 316, 320, 357, 365, 379, and 490n104, and for Barnes,' see pp. 7, 287, 289-91, 294-5, 300-1, 323-4, 360-1, 377, 480n52, 490n124, and 505-6n94.

⁸⁹ Mark O. Prentiss, "Relief Man Tells Tragedy," *The New York Times*, September 19, 1922, p. 1; Mark O. Prentiss, "Hasten Evacuation of Smyrna Hordes," *The New York Times*, September 27, 1922.

⁹⁰ For examples of Prentiss' mercurial, misleading, and contradictory reporting, see Lamb and Lamb, *The Gentle American*, 316-7, 320, 328, 331, 365, 480n42, 483n102.

⁹¹ All Barnes' assertions in this and the next paragraph can be found in Maynard Barnes to Secretary of State, from Smyrna, Turkey, Subject: The Occupation of Smyrna by the Turks and the Burning of the City, September 18, 1922, which is quoted extensively in Lamb and Lamb, *The Gentle American*. 319-321.

⁹² Gauin, "Revisiting the Fire of Izmir," 16.

⁹³ Ibid: 24.

⁹⁴ Georgelin notes Europeans were not safe, with an unknown number murdered and raped, not so much in Smyrna where small contingents of Allied forces protected them, but in the suburbs of Smyrna, Bournabat, Buka and Cordélio. Those killed who were prominent Levantines had their names published in the newspapers at the time. Georgelin, *La Fin de Smyrne*, p. 190. For the death of a British doctor named Murphy and beating and near death of Dr. MacLachlan, another British citizen, the near war between Britain and Turkey, the deaths of U.S. citizens George Carathina, Ignatius Zaferellis, Joseph Tara, and the incarceration and disappearance of other Americans, see Lamb and Lamb, *The Gentle American*, 284, 293, 300, 379, 465n91, 493n38.

⁹⁵ Gauin, "Revisiting the Fire of Izmir," 24.

⁹⁶ When a disillusioned Dr. Esther Lovejoy wrote to Horton in 1927 saying her "confidence in history has been so shaken by the misinformation circulated regarding the finish of minorities in Turkey," Horton reassured her "the truth must ultimately prevail." Esther Lovejoy to George Horton, May 28, 1927; George Horton to Esther Lovejoy, May 30, 1927. This letter, along with other correspondence cited in this article, is available in the Horton papers at Georgetown University.

⁹⁷ Lamb and Lamb, *The Gentle American*, pp. 414-415.

⁹⁸ Kirli, "Forgetting the Smyrna Fire."

⁹⁹ For example, she cites Lowry's review of sources and claims "Armenian and Greek historians base their arguments that the Turkish army started the fire on a book by the American Consul George Horton whose anti-Turkish bias is crudely explicit." She also borrows Lowry's points about Gerscovich and claims, as mentioned in note 78, that Housepian's book on Smyrna is "based largely on the sources utilized by Horton," which is transparently false. Ibid, p. 33.

¹⁰⁰ For example, Kirli asserted Allied peace terms were so severe that Turkey was losing Anatolia. Anatolia is 755,689 square kilometers. The Treaty of Sèvres assigned an area of 17,452 sq. km. to the jurisdiction of Greece but under the suzerainty of the Sultan. Thus, the Greek occupation zone was only 2.3% of the Anatolian land mass, and it remained under Turkish sovereignty. At the height of Greek military operations, which were in response to attacks by Turkish Nationalists, Greek forces held 53,00 sq. km., or just 7% percent of Anatolia. Victoria Solomonidis, "Greece in Asia Minor: the Greek Administration of the Vilayet of Aidin, 1919-1922." Dissertation submitted for doctoral degree, King's College, University of London, 1984: 123, 153.

¹⁰¹ Kirli, "Forgetting the Smyrna Fire," p. 36.

¹⁰² Ibid, 37.

¹⁰³ Ibid, 39.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, 38-40.

¹⁰⁵ Hlamides cites Kirli, but also other Turkish sources, such as Gulfren Iren and Ibrahim Gez, who acknowledge that Turks fired the city. Hlamides, "The Smyrna Holocaust," in Tessa Hofmann et al. *The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks*: 205-06.

¹⁰⁶ In addition to the works specifically cited below, Horton's insights have been substantiated by Taner Akcam and Umit Kurt, "After Lausanne: The Armenians Remaining Outside of Turkey," in Taner Akcam and Umit Kurt, *The Spirit of the Laws: The Plunder of Wealth in the Armenian Genocide* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2018); Eleftheria Daleziou, "Britain and the Greek-Turkish War and Settlement of 1919-1923: The Pursuit of Security by 'Proxy' in Western Asia Minor." PhD thesis. (Glasgow University: 2002); Fatma Müge

Göçek, *Denial of Violence: Ottoman Past, Turkish Present, and Collective Violence against the Armenians, 1789-2009* (Oxford University Press, 2015); Robert Shenk and Sam Koktzoglou, eds., *The Greek Genocide in American Naval War Diaries* (New Orleans: University of New Orleans Press, 2020); George N. Shirinian, George N., ed. *Genocide in the Ottoman Empire: Armenians, Assyrians, and Greeks, 1913-1923* (Berghahn Books, 2017); particularly the chapters by Tehmine Martoyan, "The Destruction of Smyrna in 1922: An Armenian and Greek Shared Tragedy," and Thea Halo, "The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks, 1913-1923: Myths and Facts."

¹⁰⁷ Horton said he wrote the book "to show that the destruction of Smyrna was but the closing act in a consistent program of exterminating Christianity [and that] this process of extermination was carried on over a considerable period of time, with fixed purpose, with system, and with painstaking minute details; and it was accomplished with unspeakable cruelties." See George Horton, *The Blight of Asia*, introduction.

¹⁰⁸ Morris and Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*:1, 491-92. For more on the smaller Christian minorities targeted by the Turks, see David Gaunt, Jan Bet-Sawoce, and Racho Donef, *Massacres, resistance, protectors: Muslim-Christian relations in Eastern Anatolia during World War I* (Gorgias Press, 2006).

¹⁰⁹ Wolfgang Gust's book based on declassified German archives concludes Ottoman leaders "decided on the final annihilation of the Armenian people and carried this plan out." As Gust points out, German military and diplomatic reporting has a unique authenticity because the Ottomans only allowed Germans (not Austrians or other allies) to pass coded messages by telegraph, thus keeping them secret and candid. For this reason, Gust's book is a seminal work, but it should be noted that decades before its publication, the personal accounts of Germans and Austrians and even Turks testifying to the Armenian genocide were already compelling. See Vahakn N. Dadrian, "Documentation of the Armenian Genocide" in Charny, Israel W. *Genocide: A Critical Bibliographic Review. Vol. 3, the Widening Circle of Genocide*. New Brunswick, U.S.A: Transaction Publishers, 1994; for recent Turkish accounts of the genocide, see Fatma Müge Göçek, *Denial of Violence*; Wolfgang Gust, *The Armenian Genocide: Evidence from the German Foreign Office Archives, 1915-1916*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2014: 5.

¹¹⁰ Gust concludes there was no "military necessity" for the deportations at all, as do Morris and Ze'evi and Taner Akcam. Gust, *The Armenian Genocide*: 57, 66, 86-87; Taner Akcam, *The Young Turks' Crime against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire*, 2013: xix; and Morris and Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*, 47-67, 383-85, 406-419.

¹¹¹ Morris and Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*: 488, 501.

¹¹² The most prominent scholar questioning the genocides, and particularly the Armenian genocide, is Guenter Lewy. The problems with his thesis and evidence have been amply illustrated by Taner Akcam. Also, as we demonstrate in Horton's biography, Lewy, like other scholars supporting the official Turkish government position, selectively cites sources out of context. Guenter Lewy, *Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide* (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2014): 188-89; Taner Akcam, "Guenter Lewy's The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey," *Genocide Studies and Prevention*. 3.1 (2008): 111-145; Lamb and Lamb, *The Gentle American*, 83-5, 88-9, 374, 422, 445n25, 446n40.

¹¹³ Hlamides, "The Smyrna Holocaust," in Tessa Hofmann et al. *The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks*: 223-24.

¹¹⁴ Horton is not so graphic as Morris and Ze'evi, who document the Turks, with popular participation, branded, crucified, burned alive, mutilated, and stoned their victims, and conducted mass rape of both young girls and boys. They concluded the Turks were far more sadistic than the Nazis in executing genocide, noting that with the Nazis, "in most cases the process was impersonal and cold, and geared only to extermination." Morris and Ze'evi, Morris and Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*, 3, 485, 488, 501.

¹¹⁵ Morris and Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*, 494.

¹¹⁶ See notes 2, 65, 66, and 67 above.

¹¹⁷ He reported this from Salonica before his transfer to Smyrna in May 1919. Lamb and Lamb, *The Gentle American*, 140.

¹¹⁸ Isaiah Friedman. *British Miscalculations: The Rise of Muslim Nationalism, 1918-1925*. Routledge, 2017: 33-34.

¹¹⁹ David Fromkin, "Gamblers on the Turkish Brink," *Military History Quarterly*, Spring 1989: 94.

¹²⁰ Vartkes Yeghiayan, *British Reports on Ethnic Cleansing in Anatolia, 1919-1922: The Armenian-Greek Section* (Glendale, Calif.: Center for Armenian Remembrance, 2007): pp. 22, and 21-28, 44-45; Morris and Ze'evi, *The Thirty-Year Genocide*, pp. 272-74; 288; and Lamb and Lamb, *The Gentle American*, pp. 152-3, 453n44-7.

¹²¹ The Turks often released prisoners to conduct such crimes, including participation in massacres. See for example, Wolfgang Gust, *The Armenian Genocide*.

¹²² The Interallied Commission to investigate the Greek landing reached this conclusion, as have modern sources. See Milton, *Paradise Lost*. 142.

¹²³ Solomonidis, "Greece in Asia Minor," 52-53.

¹²⁴ An Allied commission of inquiry determined that there were about 160 Greek and 300-400 Turkish casualties in an incident the Turks themselves instigated, whereas Turkish propagandists alleged marauding Greeks massacred thousands of innocent Turks. Peter Buzanski, "The Inter Allied Investigation of the Greek Invasion of Smyrna, 1919," *The Historian* (May 1963).

¹²⁵ For an example of egregiously false Turkish propaganda on the Greek landing and occupation, see Colonel Rchid Galib, "Smyrna During the Greek Occupation," *Current History*, V. 18 May 1923, pp. 318-19.

¹²⁶ Lamb and Lamb, *The Gentle American*, pp. 144-49, 152-3, 160-61.

¹²⁷ See Imini Lamb, "Europe's Killing Fields," *The New European* (April 4, 2023); and Imini Lamb and Christopher Lamb, "Misconceptions and Inaccurate History Countered by *The Gentle American*," *The National Herald*, September 26, 2022.

¹²⁸ Turkish intelligence reports made this point. Solomonidis, "Greece in Asia Minor," pp. 196-197. See also Michael Llewellyn Smith, *Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor 1919-1922* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1973).

¹²⁹ Lamb, *The Gentle American*, 157-60.

¹³⁰ A series of authoritative accounts have, in our opinion, settled the issue of what happened in Smyrna. As Shenk notes, Marjorie Housepian Dobkin's *Smyrna 1922* is the standard work on the subject. Milton's, *Paradise Lost* relied on sources that were neither Greek nor Turkish to demonstrate that Turkish forces set the city aflame. Robert Shenk's *America's Black Sea Fleet* further enriches the evidence with valuable mining of testimonies by American naval officers. Most recently, Lou Ureneck's *The Great Fire* has added even more sources to reach the same conclusion. All these books substantiate Horton's account of the city's sacking, as do Shenk, *America's Black Sea Fleet*, chapter 10, and Hatzidimitriou, "The Destruction of Smyrna in 1922", in Shirinian, ed., *The Asia Minor Catastrophe and the Ottoman Greek Genocide*.

¹³¹ See Lamb and Lamb, *The Gentle American*, Chapter 13, "The Vote," and the epilogue.

¹³² The British Charge d'Affairs in Athens reported to London on Greek attitudes about Allied obligations to assist with the refugee crisis. In the terse diplomatic prose of telegrams back then, he grossly understated the situation, simply noting that since the "original landing at Smyrna was by mandate of allies, Greeks may

reasonably hope for assistance in saving refugees." Hlamides, "The Smyrna Holocaust," in Tessa Hofmann et al. *The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks*: 218.

¹³³ Horton's explanation for Italian, French, and British policy is found in chapters 24-27 of *The Blight of Asia*. Even though we now know much more about European policies at the time than Horton did, what he knew of their betrayal is correct and until recently, widely ignored. For just one example of modern scholarship supporting Horton's take, see Taner Akçam, *A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility* (Metropolitan Books/Holt: 2007): 372-376.

¹³⁴ Stefan Ihrig, *Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014); and Stefan Ihrig, *Justifying Genocide: Germany and the Armenians from Bismarck to Hitler* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2016).

¹³⁵ Horton, *The Blight of Asia*, 29.

¹³⁶ Lamb and Lamb, *The Gentle American*: 410.

¹³⁷ Turkish scholar Taner Akcam is one example, but there are many others. Taner Akçam, *The Young Turks' Crime against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire*. Princeton University Press, 2012, p. 452. Other Turkish intellectuals decrying the genocides are identified in Hamberson Aghbashian, *Turkish Intellectuals Who Have Recognized the Reality of the Armenian Genocide, Vol. I and II* (Nor-Or Publications: 2015 and 2018).

¹³⁸ See Ismini Lamb, "Smyrna 1922: The Truth Still Matters," *Ekathimerini.com*, July 9, 2022.

¹³⁹ For Horton's thoughts on truth, see Lamb and Lamb, *The Gentle American*, 413-15.